The American Takings Revolution and Public Trust Preservation: A Tale of Two Blackstones by Hudson, Blake
Louisiana State University Law Center 
LSU Law Digital Commons 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2013 
The American Takings Revolution and Public Trust Preservation: A 
Tale of Two Blackstones 
Blake Hudson 
Louisiana State University Law Center, blake.hudson@law.lsu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Hudson, Blake, "The American Takings Revolution and Public Trust Preservation: A Tale of Two 
Blackstones" (2013). Journal Articles. 151. 
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship/151 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at LSU Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of LSU Law Digital Commons. 
For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2171515
2013	   SEA	  GRANT	  LAW	  AND	  POLICY	  JOURNAL,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  2	   	  
	  
57




Abstract:	  The	  U.S.	  Constitution	  was	  forged	  out	  of	  a	  revolution	  that	  both	  rejected	  and	  embraced	  aspects	  of	  
English	   legal	   tradition.	  The	  Takings	  Clause	  and	   its	   subsequent	   jurisprudential	   interpretation	   represents	  a	  
rejection	  of	  what	  the	  Framers	  at	  the	  time	  and	  constitutional	  Reframers	  since	  that	  time	  viewed	  as	  central	  
government	   over-­‐reaching	   and	   improper	   interference	  with	   private	   property	   rights.	   The	   Framers	   left	   fully	  
intact—and	   a	   different	   set	   of	   constitutional	   Reframers	   are	   increasingly	   seeking	   to	   use—the	   English	  
common	  law	  doctrine	  of	  public	  trust	  to	  prevent	  private	  property	  rights	  from	  trumping	  the	  public’s	  interest	  in	  
certain	  resources,	  especially	  in	  the	  coastal	  zone.	  This	  doctrine	  inherently	  conflicts	  with	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  
in	  many	   cases,	   for	   if	   a	   resource	   is	   protected	   by	   the	   public	   trust,	   then	   any	   restrictions	   on	   property	  made	  
pursuant	  to	  that	  protection	  cannot	  result	  in	  a	  taking—the	  restrained	  activity	  was	  never	  part	  of	  the	  property	  
owner’s	  bundle	  of	  property	  rights	  to	  begin	  with.	  This	  essay	  highlights	  the	  inevitable	  legal	  tension	  between	  
the	   Takings	   Clause	   and	   public	   trust	   doctrine	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   coastal	   zone	   resources	   in	   a	   time	   of	  
climate	   change.	   The	   article	   explores	   three	   implications	   of	   the	   Takings	   Clause-­‐public	   trust	   tension:	   (1)	  
resolution	   of	   future	   legal	   controversies	   related	   to	   climate	   change	   along	   the	   coast;	   (2)	   a	   potential	  
rebalancing	   of	   modern	   takings	   jurisprudence,	   which	   has	   arguably	   disturbed	   the	   appropriate	   balance	  
between	   private	   property	   protections	   and	   the	   public	   good;	   and	   (3)	   the	   creation	   of	   better	   governance	  
structures	   through	   institutional	   design	   enhancements	   and	   adjustments—in	   this	   case	   focusing	   on	   the	  
institution	  that	  is	  U.S.	  constitutional	  law.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	   third	   absolute	   right,	   inherent	   in	   every	   Englishman,	   is	   that	   of	  
property.2	  
- William	  Blackstone	  
	  
[T]here	   are	   some	   few	   things	   which,	   notwithstanding	   the	   general	  
introduction	   and	   continuance	   of	   property,	   must	   still	   unavoidably	  
remain	   in	  common3	  …	   it	   follows	  from	  the	  very	  end	  and	  constitution	  of	  
society,	  that	  this	  natural	  right,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  others	  belonging	  to	  man	  
as	  an	  individual,	  may	  be	  restrained	  by	  positive	  laws	  enacted	  for	  reasons	  
of	  state	  or	  for	  the	  supposed	  benefit	  of	  the	  community.4	  
- William	  Blackstone	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Associate	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  LSU	  Law	  Center	  and	  LSU	  School	  of	  the	  Coast	  and	  Environment.	  For	  their	  comments	  
and	   insights,	   I	   wish	   to	   thank	   all	   of	   the	   participants	   in	   the	   History,	   Property,	   &	   Climate	   Change	   in	   the	   Former	  
Colonies	  Symposium	  at	  Washington	  &	  Lee	  University	  School	  of	  Law.	  I	  am	  further	  grateful	  to	  the	  organizers	  of	  the	  
conference	  for	   inviting	  me	  to	  participate	   in	  the	  symposium,	  and	  in	  particular	  Jill	  Fraley	  for	  her	  efforts	   in	  making	  
the	  conference	  a	  resounding	  success.	  Finally,	  I	  thank	  the	  peer-­‐reviewers	  and	  editors	  of	  the	  Sea	  Grant	  Law	  &	  Policy	  
Journal	   for	  reviewing	  and	  publishing	  this	  article	  and	  for	  their	  wonderful	  suggestions,	  edits,	  and	  effort.	   I	  dedicate	  
this	  article	  to	  my	  good	  friend	  and	  mentor	  Clark	  Hultquist,	  who	  cultivated	  my	  love	  of	  history	  and	  who	  has	  provided	  
a	  model	  of	  teaching,	  scholarship,	  and	  service	  to	  which	  I	  aspire.	  
2	  SIR	  WILLIAM	  BLACKSTONE,	  COMMENTARIES	  ON	   THE	   LAWS	  OF	  ENGLAND:	   IN	   FOUR	   BOOKS,	   Vol.	   1,	   *137	   (William	   Draper	  
Lewis	  ed.,	  Rees	  Welsh	  &	  Company	  1915).	  
3	  SIR	  WILLIAM	   BLACKSTONE,	   COMMENTARIES	   ON	   THE	   LAWS	   OF	   ENGLAND:	   IN	   FOUR	   BOOKS,	   Vol.	   2,	   *14	   (William	   Draper	  
Lewis	  ed.,	  Rees	  Welsh	  &	  Company	  1915).	  
4	  Id.	  at	  *411.	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The	  story	  of	  the	  American	  Revolution	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  governance	  structure	  
has	  been	  told	  many	  times	  and	  through	  many	  different	   lenses,	  both	  contemporary	  and	  historical.	  The	  
continued	  retelling	  of	  this	  story	  is	  understandable	  given	  the	  remarkable	  form	  of	  governance	  established	  
by	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution.	  The	  Constitution	  is	  the	  oldest	  written	  constitution	  in	  continuous	  use,	  and	  has	  
become	   a	   model	   document	   upon	   which	   many	   other	   nations	   have	   based	   their	   own	   governmental	  
structures.	  	  
The	  Constitution,	  of	  course,	  was	   forged	  out	  of	   revolution,	  which	  drove	  the	  need	  to	  place	   in	  more	  
tangible	  textual	  form	  the	  new	  governance	  structure	  that	  would	   immediately	  be	  needed	  to	  ensure	  the	  
success	  of	  a	  new	  nation.	  Yet	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  be	  reminded	  at	  the	  most	  fundamental	  level	  of	  why	  precisely	  
the	   Framers	   chose	   to	   establish	   an	   entire	   governance	   structure	   in	   textual	   form	   and	   break	   from	   the	  
manner	  in	  which	  governments	  had	  historically	  operated	  up	  until	  1787.	  Ultimately,	  our	  Framers	  chose	  to	  
place	  in	  written	  form	  the	  rules	  of	  governance	  and	  rights	  that	  they	  had	  been	  denied	  under	  English	  rule—
rights	   they	   believed	   were	   not	   guaranteed	   under	   English	   law,	   thus	   leading	   to	   revolution.	   After	   all,	  
England	  was,	   and	   remains	   to	   this	   day,	   governed	   by	   an	   unwritten	   constitution.5	  The	   Framers	   did	   not	  
want	  our	  new	  nation	  to	  be	  guided	  entirely	  by	  unwritten	  rules	  implemented	  at	  the	  whim	  of	  centralized	  
authority	  and	  dependent	  upon	   the	  benevolence	  of	   a	  monarch	  or	   the	  policies	  of	   a	  parliament	   that,	   in	  
some	  respects,	  made	  up	  procedure	  and	  rules	  of	  governance	  as	  they	  went.	  Yet	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution	  did	  
not	   fully	   supplant	   English	   law.	   Rather,	   the	   Constitution	   can	   be	   conceptualized	   as	   a	   modification	   of	  
English	  law	  that	  at	  its	  core	  melded	  one	  legal	  tradition,	  English	  common	  law,	  with	  a	  new	  legal	  institution	  
that	  we	  call	   constitutional	   law.	  While	  English	  common	   law	  dates	  as	   far	  back	  as	  1066	  and	  William	  the	  
Conqueror,	   residing	   largely	  within	   and	  developed	  by	   the	   individual	   states,	  modern	   constitutional	   law	  
looks	  to	  text	  established	  at	  the	  genesis	  of	  our	  government	  for	  answers	  to	  the	  most	  fundamental	  legal	  
questions.	   This	   melding	   demonstrates	   that	   our	   chosen	   form	   of	   governance	   in	   the	   U.S.	   ultimately	  
maintained	  the	  parts	  of	  English	  law	  that	  we	  preferred	  within	  state	  common	  law,	  while	  rejecting	  through	  
constitutional	  text	  those	  parts	  that	  we	  did	  not	  prefer.	  
Perhaps	  nothing	  illustrates	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  schizophrenic	  homage	  to	  English	  legal	  tradition	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  inevitable	  collision	  of	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  of	  the	  Fifth	  Amendment	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution	  
and	   the	   common	   law	   public	   trust	   doctrine—a	   collision	   that	   has	   direct	   implications	   for	   coastal	   zone	  
resource	  management	   in	   the	   face	   of	   climate	   change.	   These	   two	   principles	   of	  modern	   American	   law	  
may	   be	   said	   to	   represent	   polar	   propositions	   put	   forth	   by	   the	   renowned	   English	   jurist	   and	   legal	  
philosopher	   William	   Blackstone.	   Blackstone	   has	   been	   credited	   with	   providing	   the	   most	   thorough	  
accounting	   of	   English	   law	   through	   the	   mid-­‐18th	   Century.	   Indeed,	   by	   some	   accounts	   the	   impact	   of	  
Blackstone	  on	   legal	   theory	   in	  the	  19th	  century	  was	  “greater	   in	  the	  United	  States	  than	   in	  Blackstone’s	  
native	  land.	  After	  the	  American	  Revolutionary	  War	  [Blackstone’s]	  Commentaries	  was	  the	  chief	  source	  
of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  English	  law	  in	  the	  American	  republic.	  A	  work	  that	  was	  a	  textbook	  in	  the	  old	  country	  
became	  in	  the	  new	  one	  an	  oracle	  of	  law.”6	  	  
The	   Takings	   Clause	   to	   some,	   and	   as	   interpreted	   by	  many	   courts	   today,	   represents	   a	   principle	   of	  
Blackstonian	   philosophy	   often	   cited	   by	   property	   rights	   advocates	   that	   property	   rights	   are	   inherent,	  
inalienable	  rights	  crucial	  to	  the	  success	  of	  a	  free	  society,7	  and	  as	  a	  result	  should	  be	  as	  free	  as	  possible	  
from	  government	  intrusion.	  Indeed,	  though	  some	  form	  of	  due	  process	  had	  been	  guaranteed	  to	  English	  
property	  owners	  since	  the	  Magna	  Carta,	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  owes	  its	  very	  existence	  to,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  See	   generally,	   Jane	   Ball,	   The	   Boundaries	   of	   Property	   Rights	   in	   English	   Law:	   Report	   to	   the	   XVIIth	   International	  
Congress	   of	   Comparative	   Law,	   10.3	   ELECTRONIC	   JOURNAL	   OF	   COMPARATIVE	   LAW	   (2006),	   available	   at	  
http://www.ejcl.org/103/abs103-­‐1.html.	  	  
6	  Encyclopedia	  Britannica,	  Sir	  William	  Blackstone,	  http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/68589/Sir-­‐
William-­‐Blackstone/729/Assessment	  (last	  visited	  Jan.	  15,	  2013).	  
7	  BLACKSTONE	  COMMENTARIES,	  supra	  note	  2.	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a	   partial	   rejection	   of	   English	   property	   law.	   The	   Takings	   Clause	   “provided	   greater	   protection	   for	   the	  
property	   owner	   than	   the	   property	   owner	   had	   traditionally	   received,”8	  since	   the	   Magna	   Carta	   was	  
intended	  to	  provide	  compensation	  only	  when	  personal	  property	  was	  taken	  by	  the	  government.	  Physical	  
governmental	   appropriation	   of	   private	   land,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   did	   not	   require	   compensation.	   The	  
English	  crown	  was	  only	  prohibited	  from	  “tak[ing]	  anyone’s	  grain	  or	  other	  chattels,	  without	  immediately	  
paying	   the	   money.”9	  In	   contrast,	   “the	   sole	   limitation	   on	   government	   seizure	   of	   land	   was	   one	   of	  
procedural	   regularity,”10	  with	   the	  Magna	  Carta	  declaring	   that	   “[n]o	   free	  man	   shall	   be	  dispossessed	   ...	  
except	   by	   the	   legal	   judgement	   of	   his	   peers	   or	   by	   the	   law	  of	   the	   land.”11	  The	   colonies	   operated	  under	   a	  
similar	  application	  of	  English	  law,	  only	  compensating	  for	  the	  dispossession	  of	  personal	  property	  by	  the	  
government,	   and	   “[n]o	   colonial	   charter	   required	   compensation	   for	   the	   seizure	   of	   land,”	   even	   when	  
colonial	  governments	  built	  roads	  on	  undeveloped,	  private	  lands.12	  
Thus	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  codification	  of	  Jeffersonian	  notions	  of	  property13—at	  
least	   in	   the	   mind	   of	   the	   Framer	   primarily	   responsible	   for	   its	   inclusion	   in	   the	   Constitution,	   James	  
Madison14—contemplating	  that	  a	  stable,	  free,	  and	  truly	  democratic	  society	  would	  be	  best	  crafted	  from	  
the	  participatory	  decision-­‐making	  of	  a	  landed	  populous,	  where	  citizens	  maintained	  protected	  rights	  to	  
property	  as	  free	  as	  possible	  from	  direct	   interference	  or	  abuses	  of	  centralized	  authority.15	  Madison	  and	  
other	  Framers	  were	  obviously	  concerned	  with	  abuses	  that	  had	  occurred	  under	  English	  occupation.	  For	  
example,	  
	  
In	   drafting	   the	   [Takings	   Clause],	   it	   appears	   that	   Madison	   sought	   to	   address	   very	   particular	  
concerns.	  One	  type	  of	  government	  action	  during	  the	   revolutionary	  era	   that	   troubled	  him	  was	  
the	  seizure	  of	   loyalist	   land.	  Such	  seizure	  had	  occurred	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  epic	  proportions:	  Loyalist	  
property	  worth	  more	   than	   twenty	  million	  dollars—one	   tenth	   the	  value	  of	   real	  property	   in	   the	  
country—was	  confiscated.16	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  William	  Michael	  Treanor,	  The	  Original	  Understanding	  of	   the	  Takings	  Clause,	  Georgetown	  Environmental	  Law	  &	  
Policy	  Institutes	  Papers	  &	  Reports,	  5	  (1998),	  available	  at	  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi_papers/2/.	  
9	  Magna	  Carta,	  Art.	  28.	  
10	  Treanor,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  5.	  
11	  Magna	  Carta,	  Art.	  39	  (emphasis	  added).	  
12	  Treanor,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  5.	  
13	  See	  Luigi	  Marco	  Bassani,	  Life,	  Liberty,	  and	  …	  :	  Jefferson	  on	  Property	  Rights,	  18	  J.	  OF	  LIBERTARIAN	  STUDIES	  31,	  79-­‐81	  
(2004),	  available	  at	  http://mises.org/journals/jls/18_1/18_1_2.pdf	  (noting	  that	  “Jefferson	  did	  not	  reject	  the	  natural	  
right	  of	  property	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  higher	  form	  of	  democracy,	  but	  rather	  derived	  his	  higher	  form	  of	  democracy	  from	  the	  
right	  of	  property,”	  and	  that	  “the	  true	  meaning	  of	  the	  ‘pursuit	  of	  happiness’	   in	  Jeffersonian	  doctrine”	  means	  that	  
“the	   right	   to	   have	   a	   government	   that	   does	   not	   infringe	   on	   one’s	   own	   natural	   rights,	   in	   particular	   on	   property	  
rights,”	  and	  quoting	  Jefferson:	  “the	  true	  foundation	  of	  republican	  government	  is	  the	  equal	  right	  of	  every	  citizen,	  in	  
his	  person	  and	  property,	  and	  in	  their	  management.”)	  
14	  Treanor,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  2.	  
15	  The	  Takings	  Clause	  “was	  probably	  intended	  to	  restrain	  the	  arbitrary	  and	  oppressive	  mode	  of	  obtaining	  supplies	  
for	   the	   army,	   and	  other	   public	   uses,	   by	   impressment,	   as	  was	   too	   frequently	   practiced	  during	   the	   revolutionary	  
war.”	  Id.	  at	  4-­‐5.	  
16	  Id.	  at	  5.	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A	  review	  of	  the	  rights	  the	  English	  crown	  historically	  maintained,	  and	  parliament	  maintains	  today,	  
on	   private	   property	   in	   Britain	   bears	   out	   a	   contrast	   to	   the	   American	   property	   ideal.17	  Thus,	   the	   U.S.	  
Constitution	  placed	  explicit	  and	  more	  stringent	   limits	  on	  the	  government	  than	  existed	  in	  England	  and	  
that	  we	  still	  adhere	  to	  today	  (though	   in	  varying	  degrees	  depending	  on	  the	  constitutional	   interpreter).	  
Property	   can	   be	   appropriated	   or	   regulated	   by	   the	   government,	   but	   only	   for	   public	   use	   and	   after	  
compensation	  is	  awarded	  to	  the	  property	  owner	  for	  their	  loss	  of	  property	  or	  loss	  of	  use	  of	  property.	  	  
Modern	  debates	  over	  the	  meaning	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  occur	  somewhere	  between	  two	  
extremes—those	   who	   argue	   that	   the	   Framers	   intended	   compensation	   to	   be	   owed	   for	   virtually	   any	  
limitation	  on	  private	  property	  (i.e.,	  any	  regulations)18	  and	  those	  who	  believe	  the	  Framers	  only	  intended	  
the	  clause	  to	  apply	   to	  physical	  appropriation	  of	  property	  by	  the	  government	   (i.e.,	  eminent	  domain).19	  
Either	  way,	  however,	   it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  Framers	   intended	  more	  stringent	  protections	  than	  those	  
existing	  in	  England,	  making	  more	  concrete	  the	  notion	  that	  property	  is	  the	  absolute	  and	  inherent	  right	  
of	  every	  American,	  to	  paraphrase	  Blackstone.	  
Even	  though	  the	  Framers	  rejected	  an	  aspect	  of	  English	  legal	  tradition	  by	  etching	  in	  stone	  Takings	  
Clause	   protections,	   they	   left	   fully	   intact	   English	   common	   law	   principles	   of	   public	   trust,	   which	   has	  
historically	  applied	  to	  resources	  like	  the	  coastal	  zone,	  submerged	  lake	  beds,	  and	  wildlife.20	  Though	  the	  
public	  trust	  doctrine	  had	  been	   implicitly	  discussed	   in	  earlier	  cases,21	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  doctrine	   in	  the	  
United	  States	  has	  long	  been	  considered	  the	  case	  of	  Illinois	  Central	  Railroad	  vs.	  Illinois.22	  In	  Illinois	  Central,	  
the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	   the	  state	  of	   Illinois	  could	  not	  divest	   the	  submerged	   lake	  bed	  under	  
Lake	   Michigan	   to	   a	   private	   enterprise	   without	   considering	   whether	   such	   a	   divestment	   properly	  
accounted	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  public,	  who	  in	  fact	  held	  title	  to	  the	  property.	  The	  Court	  went	  to	  great	  
lengths	   to	   trace	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   doctrine	   back	   to	   England	   (and	   even	   further	   to	   Roman	   times),	  
detailing	   that	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   public	   tracked	   the	   historic	   rights	   of	   the	   English	   Crown	   regarding	  
navigable	  waters	  and	  land	  submerged	  underneath	  them.	  	  
Just	   four	  years	  after	   Illinois	  Central	  the	  Court	  undertook	  a	  similar	  historical	  analysis	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
Geer	  v.	  Connecticut,23	  where	  it	  upheld	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  state	  to	  establish	  laws	  regulating	  the	  taking	  
of	  wildlife.	  The	  Court’s	  analysis	  hinged	  on	  the	  finding	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  public	  inhered	  in	  the	  state’s	  
wildlife	  just	  as	  the	  Crown	  in	  England	  maintained	  ultimate	  control	  over	  wildlife.	  As	  scholars	  have	  noted,	  
“the	   essential	   core	   of	   English	   wildlife	   law	   on	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   American	   Revolution	  was	   the	   complete	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  MICHAEL	   BEAN	   AND	   MELANIE	   ROWLAND,	   THE	   EVOLUTION	   OF	   NATIONAL	   WILDLIFE	   LAW	   7-­‐10	   (3d	   ed.	   1997).	   For	   an	  
example	  of	  the	  fluid	  nature	  of	  English	  property	  rights	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  government	  to	  change	  and	  adapt	  them	  
over	  time,	  see	  CHRISTOPHER	  RODGERS,	  PROPERTY	  RIGHTS,	  LAND	  USE	  AND	  THE	  RURAL	  ENVIRONMENT:	  A	  CASE	  FOR	  REFORM,	  
LAND	   USE	   POLICY	   26S	   S134–S141	   (2009),	   available	   at	   http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/land-­‐
use/jlup/16_property_rights_land_use_and_the_rural_environment_-­‐_a_case_for_reform.pdf.	  
18	  See,	   e.g.,	   RICHARD	  EPSTEIN,	  TAKINGS:	  PRIVATE	  PROPERTY	  AND	  THE	  POWER	  OF	  EMINENT	  DOMAIN	   (1985)	   (arguing	   that	  
any	  net	  diminution	  in	  the	  value	  of	  property	  requires	  compensation).	  
19	  See	  Treanor,	  supra	  note	  8.	  	  
20	  See	  Blake	  Hudson,	  The	  Public	  and	  Wildlife	  Trust	  Doctrines	  and	  the	  Untold	  Story	  of	  the	  Lucas	  Remand,	  34	  COLUM.	  J.	  
ENVTL.	  L.	  99	  (2009).	  
21	  See,	   i.e.,	  Martin	   v.	   Waddell’s	   Lessee,	   41	   U.S.	   367	   (1842).	   In	  Martin,	   the	   Court	   found	   it	   unjustifiable	   for	   “the	  
shores,	  and	  rivers	  and	  bays	  and	  arms	  of	  the	  sea,	  and	  the	  land	  under	  them,	  instead	  of	  being	  held	  as	  a	  public	  trust	  
for	   the	  benefit	  of	   the	  whole	  community	  …	  had	  been	  converted	  by	  the	  charter	   itself	   into	  private	  property,	   to	  be	  
parcelled	  out	  and	  sold	  by	  the	  duke,	  for	  his	  own	  individual	  emolument[.]”	  Id.	  at	  413.	  One	  author	  has	  noted	  that	  the	  
Court	   in	  Martin	   found	  that	  “the	  public	  trust	  character	  of	  navigable	  waters	  and	  their	  submerged	   lands	  survived	  a	  
grant	  by	  the	  King	  of	  his	  proprietary	   interest	   in	   them	  …	  the	  question	  was	  whether	   it	  also	  survived	  the	  American	  
Revolution.	  [The	  Court]	  declared	  that	  it	  did.”	  BEAN,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  11.	  
22	  146	  U.S.	  387	  (1892).	  
23	  161	  U.S.	  519,	  528–29	  (1896).	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authority	  of	   the	  King	  and	  Parliament	  to	  determine	  what	  rights	  others	  might	  have	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
taking	  of	  wildlife”—largely	  with	  little	  regard	  to	  what	  citizen	  property	  rights	  may	  be	  infringed.24	  The	  U.S.	  
Supreme	  Court	  has	  described	  the	  transition	  of	  this	  power	  to	  the	  states,	  noting	  that	  when	  state	  citizens	  
“took	  possession	  of	  the	  reins	  of	  government,	  and	  took	  into	  their	  own	  hands	  the	  powers	  of	  sovereignty,	  
the	  prerogatives	  and	  regalities	  which	  before	  belonged	  either	  to	  the	  crown	  or	  the	  parliament,	  became	  
immediately	  and	  rightfully	  vested	  in	  the	  state,”25	  and	  that,	  	  
	  
Undoubtedly,	  this	  attribute	  of	  government	  to	  control	  the	  taking	  of	  animals	  ferae	  naturae,	  which	  
was	  thus	  recognized	  and	  enforced	  by	  the	  common	   law	  of	  England,	  was	  vested	   in	  the	  colonial	  
governments.	  …	  It	   is	  also	  certain	  that	  the	  power	  which	  the	  colonies	  thus	  possessed	  passed	  to	  
the	   states	  with	   the	   separation	   from	   the	  mother	   country,	   and	   remains	   in	   them	  at	   the	  present	  
day.26	  	  
	  
Scholars	   have	   further	   described	   the	   authority	   that	   this	   trust	   gave	   the	   English	   Crown	   and	   U.S.	   state	  
governments	  as	  follows,	  	  
	  
English	  laws,	  which	  gave	  the	  Crown	  complete	  authority	  to	  determine	  the	  rights	  of	  landowners	  
with	  respect	  to	  wildlife	  management,	  also	  became	  part	  of	  the	  common	  law	  of	  the	  colonies	  and	  
eventually	  that	  of	  the	  several	  states	  which	  assumed	  the	  Crown’s	  responsibility	  to	  act	  ‘as	  trustee	  
to	  support	  the	  title	  [to	  wildlife]	  for	  the	  common	  use.’27	  	  
	  
Indeed,	   the	   English	   Crown	   could	   go	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	   restrain	   private	   property	   rights	   when	  
exercising	  the	  public	  trust.	  Take,	  for	  example,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  “Forest	  Jurisdiction”—which	  was	  an	  early	  
system	  of	  forest	  laws	  administered	  by	  special	  courts	  and	  officials.	  In	  these	  jurisdictions,	  “all	  forest	  land	  
‘was	  subject	  to	  an	  easement	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  wildlife’	  that	  allowed	  forest	  officials	  to	  enter	  private	  land	  
and	  remove	  vegetation	  needed	  for	  wildlife.”28	  The	  origin	  of	  the	  Forest	  Jurisdiction	  in	  England	  was	  quite	  
dramatic,	  beginning	  when	  “William	  the	  Conqueror	  laid	  waste	  thirty-­‐six	  Towns	  in	  Hampshire	  to	  make	  a	  
Forest.”29	  Today,	   in	   a	   time	   when	   urban	   sprawl	   places	   forests,	   coastal	   wetlands,	   and	   the	   climate	  
regulation	  services	  they	  provide	  under	  increasing	  stress,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  conceptualize	  a	  policy	  mandating	  
that	   forest	   or	   wetland	   “sprawl”	   replace	   human	   development.	   Yet	   this	   extreme	   form	   of	   land	   use	  
regulation	  exercised	  by	  the	  English	  Crown	  was	  the	  origin	  of	  public	  trust	  protections	  that	  now	  reside	  in	  
state	   common	   law	   and	  which	   have	  been	   expanded	  over	   time	   to	   protect	   a	   variety	   of	   resources	   other	  
than	   submerged	   lakebeds	   under	   navigable	   waters	   and	   wildlife.	   Indeed,	   the	   continuing	   expansion	   of	  
public	   trust	   protections	   in	   the	   U.S.	   represents	   a	   second	   line	   of	   Blackstonian	   philosophy	   that	   private	  
rights	  may	  be	  restrained	  by	  positive	  law	  enacted	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  community.30	  	  
The	  fundamental	  paradox	  presented	  by	  the	  Framers’	  implicit	  retention	  of	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  
within	  state	  common	  law	  (through	  the	  10th	  Amendment)	  and	  their	  revolutionary	  textual	  codification	  of	  
the	   Takings	   Clause,	   is	   that	   if	   the	   public	   trust	   doctrine	   is	   found	   to	   legitimately	   apply,	   it	   renders	   the	  
Takings	  Clause	  meaningless,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  ill-­‐defined	  and	  unclear	  set	  of	  circumstances	  that	  continue	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  BEAN,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  10.	  
25	  Martin,	  41	  U.S.	  at	  416.	  
26	  Geer,	  161	  U.S.	  at	  527–28.	  
27	  Hope	  M.	  Babcock,	  Should	  Lucas	  v.	  South	  Carolina	  Coastal	  Council	  Protect	  Where	  the	  Wild	  Things	  Are?	  Of	  Beavers,	  
Bob-­‐O-­‐Links,	  and	  Other	  Things	  That	  Go	  Bump	  in	  the	  Night,	  85	  IOWA	  L.	  REV.	  849,	  880-­‐81	  (2000).	  
28	  BEAN,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  9.	  
29	  Id.	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  BLACKSTONE	  COMMENTARIES,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  *411.	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to	  expand	  in	  scope.	  The	  entire	  premise	  of	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  is	  that	  the	  public’s	  rights	  inhered	  in	  
certain	  resources	  or	  property	  prior	  to	  any	  private	  property	  rights	  that	  may	  later	  be	  granted	  or	  claimed	  
by	  owners	  with	  otherwise	   legal	   title	   to	   that	  property.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   rights	  of	   the	  public	  operate	  
much	  like	  a	  restrictive	  covenant	  embedded	  within	  an	  individual’s	  title.	  Thus	  if	  the	  public	  trust	  inhered	  in	  
one’s	   property—presumably	   pursuant	   to	   the	   crown’s	   authority	   during	   the	   time	   of	   British	   rule—and	  
continued	   through	   colonial	   governance,	   state	   governance	   under	   the	   Articles	   of	   Confederation,	   and	  
federal	   and	   state	   governance	   under	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution,	   then	   any	   governmental	   restrictions	   later	  
placed	  on	  that	  property	  and	  aimed	  at	  those	  trust	  resources	  could	  take	  nothing	  for	  which	  compensation	  
is	  owed.	  	  
Once	   the	   public	   trust	   doctrine	   expanded	   beyond	   submerged	   lands	   under	   navigable	   waters31	  to	  
reach	  wildlife	  and	  its	  habitat,32	  non-­‐navigable	  tributaries	  feeding	  a	  navigable	  body	  containing	  important	  
species	   habitat,33	  backfilled	   wetlands	   submerged	   by	   rising	   seas,34	  or	   dry	   sand	   beach	   dredged	   by	   the	  
state	  and	  adjacent	  to	  private	  properties,35	  it	  became	  unclear	  where	  the	  limits	  on	  public	  trust	  application	  
begin	  and	  valid	  application	  of	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  ends	  (and	  indeed	  perhaps	  it	  never	  begins).	  As	  stated	  
by	   Professor	   Lazarus,	   the	   public	   trust	   doctrine	   has	   “emerged	   from	   the	   watery	   depths	   [of	   navigable	  
waterways]	   to	   embrace	   the	   dry	   sand	   area	   of	   a	   beach,	   rural	   parklands,	   a	   historic	   battlefield,	   wildlife,	  
archaeological	  remains,	  and	  even	  a	  downtown	  area.”36	  Once	  the	  public	  trust	  inhered	  in	  these	  resources,	  
then	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  was	  rendered	  moot.	  The	  stick	  that	  constitutes	  these	  resources	  was	  not	  in	  the	  
bundle	  of	  sticks	  purchased	  by	  the	  property	  owner,	  so	  to	  speak,	  and	  so	  a	  property	  owner	  cannot	  claim	  
title	   to	   them,	   and	   in	   fact	   never	   could.	   Thus,	   nothing	   would	   be	   taken	   from	   them	   for	   which	   the	  
government	  would	  be	  required	  to	  justly	  compensate.	  	  
Perhaps	   the	   clearest	   example	   of	   the	   Takings	   Clause-­‐public	   trust	   paradox	   is	   the	   case	   of	   Lucas	   v.	  
South	   Carolina	   Coastal	   Council.37	  Lucas	  provides	   a	   number	   of	   insights	   about	   the	   history	   of	   the	   public	  
trust	  doctrine	  and	  Takings	  Clause,	  and	  their	  modern	  application	  to	  the	  coast	  in	  a	  time	  of	  climate	  change.	  
David	   Lucas,	   plaintiff	   in	   the	   case,	   argued	   for	   an	   operation	   of	   the	   Takings	   Clause	   that,	   at	   least	  
anecdotally,	   represents	   the	   “property	   as	   absolute	   right”	   Blackstone.	   Lucas,	   when	   faced	   with	  
prohibitions	  on	  the	  development	  of	  his	  beachfront	  lots	  due	  to	  regulatory	  efforts	  by	  the	  state	  of	  South	  
Carolina	  to	  battle	  eroding	  shorelines,	  stated	  the	  following:	  	  
	  
There	  are	  enemies	  of	  the	  Constitution	  here	  right	  now.	  There	  are	  core	  values	  in	  there	  that	  if	  you	  
get	   away	   from	   you	   don’t	   have	   a	   constitution.	   And	   one	   of	   them	   is	   the	   protection	   of	   private	  
property.	   That’s	  what	   America	  was	   founded	   on.	   An	   individual	   person	   can	   own,	   and	  what	   he	  
owns	  is	  his.	  And	  that	  is	  under	  attack	  …	  [I]	  had	  one	  year	  from	  the	  inception	  of	  this	  legislation	  to	  
apply	  for	  a	  building	  permit.	  I	  looked	  at	  those	  laws	  and	  regulations	  and	  I	  said	  “this	  isn’t	  fair,”	  why	  
do	  I	  have	  to	  do	  something	  on	  their	  time	  schedule	  instead	  of	  mine?	  It’s	  my	  property.	  I	  bought	  it.	  I	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  Ill.	  Cent.	  R.R.	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  458	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  Pullen	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  923	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  (Alaska	  1996).	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  National	  Audubon	  Soc’y	  v.	  Superior	  Court,	  658	  P.2d	  709	  (Cal.	  1983)	  (holding	  that	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  prevented	  
Los	  Angeles	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34	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  State	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  362	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  Richard	  Lazarus,	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  Natural	  Resources:	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paid	   almost	   $500,000	   a	   piece	   for	   these	   [lots]	   …	   My	   goals	   were	   to	   stop	   government	   from	  
encroaching	   on	   individual	   liberty	   …	   This	   was	   just	   restricting	   the	   American	   dream	   …	   The	  
individual	  should	  not	  have	  to	  sacrifice	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  public.38	  
	  
The	  statute	  at	  issue	  in	  Lucas,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  represents	  the	  Blackstonian	  principle	  of	  restricting	  
private	  property	  owner	  activities	  by	  the	  passage	  of	  “positive	  laws	  enacted	  for	  reasons	  of	  state	  or	  for	  the	  
supposed	  benefit	  of	  the	  community.”	  The	  Beachfront	  Management	  Act	  (BMA)	  was	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  
the	  South	  Carolina	  coast	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  resource	  values	  it	  provided:	  storm	  barrier	  protection,	  tourism	  
generation,	  habitat	  for	  threatened	  and	  endangered	  species,	  and	  protection	  of	  vegetation	  crucial	  to	  the	  
survival	  of	  the	  shoreline	  ecosystem.39	  The	  legislature	  found	  that	  these	  resource	  values	  were	  increasingly	  
threatened	  by	  beachfront	  development,	  which	  had	  contributed	  to	  significant	  erosion	  of	  coastal	  lands.40	  
Each	  of	  these	  resources	  has	  at	  some	  time	  or	  another	  and	  in	  one	  jurisdiction	  or	  another	  been	  subject	  to	  
public	  trust	  protections,	  notwithstanding	  takings	  claims	  brought	  by	  parties	  like	  David	  Lucas.	  
Though	   the	   Lucas	   case,	   for	   reasons	   discussed	   below,	   ultimately	   elevated	   “absolute	   right”	  
Blackstone	   over	   “benefit	   of	   the	   community”	   Blackstone,	   the	   case	   has	   come	   to	   be	   understood	   as	  
opening	   the	   door	   wide	   for	   public	   trust	   application	   to	   overcome	   takings	   claims.	   In	   Lucas,	   the	   U.S.	  
Supreme	  Court,	   through	  the	  very	  medium	  of	   its	   takings	   jurisprudence,	  provided	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  
public	  trust	  doctrine	  to	  eviscerate	  regulatory	  takings	  based	  upon	  the	  total	  economic	  deprivation	  rule	  (a	  
rule	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  argued	  makes	  a	  regulation	  the	  virtual	  equivalent	  to	  a	  physical	  appropriation	  of	  
property	   by	   the	   government).	   The	  Court	   held	   that	   regulations	   reducing	   all	   of	   the	   economic	   value	   of	  
property	  were	  categorically	  takings,	  unless	  background	  principles	  of	  the	  state’s	  law	  of	  property	  inhered	  
in	   the	   title.	   These	   background	   principles	   would	   include,	   for	   example,	   limitations	   that	   nuisance	   law	  
might	   have	   already	   placed	   upon	   the	   property.	   In	   fact,	   the	  Lucas	   case	   has	   had	   an	   “unlikely	   legacy,”41	  
since	  a	  number	  of	  “background	  principles”	  of	  property	  law	  have	  since	  been	  utilized	  to	  completely	  skirt	  
Takings	  Clause	  protections,	   including	   the	  natural	   use	  doctrine;	   the	  navigational	   servitude;	   customary	  
rights	  (like	  native	  gathering	  rights);	  water	  rights;	  Indian	  treaty	  rights;	  certain	  statutes,	  regulations,	  and	  
constitutional	   provisions;	   and,	   of	   course,	   the	   public	   and	  wildlife	   trust	   doctrines.42	  Thus,	   “[i]nstead	   of	  
increasing	   the	   likelihood	  of	   either	   land-­‐owner	   compensation	  or	  deregulation,	  Lucas’s	   principal	   legacy	  
lies	  in	  affording	  government	  defendants	  numerous	  effective	  categorical	  defenses	  with	  which	  to	  defeat	  
takings	  claims.”43	  As	  noted	  by	  Professor	  Babcock,	  	  
	  
the	  Court’s	  reliance	  on	  common	  law	  principles	  to	  craft	  an	  exception	  to	  its	  per	  se	  compensation	  
rule	  misapprehended	   the	   continued	   robustness	   of	   old	  maxims,	   such	   as	   those	   restricting	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  DVD:	  Lucas	  v.	  South	  Carolina	  Coastal	  Council,	  Duke	  University	  School	  of	  Law,	  Distinctive	  Aspects	  of	  American	  
Law	  (Duke	  Law	  2005),	  available	  at	  http://web.law.duke.edu/voices/lucas.	  	  
39	  See	  S.C.	  CODE	  ANN.	  §§	  48-­‐39-­‐20	  (Legislative	  Declaration	  of	  Findings).	  
40	  Id.;	  see	  also	  Lucas,	  505	  U.S.	  at	  1022	  n.10.	  
41	  Michael	   C.	   Blumm	  &	   Lucas	   Ritchie,	   Lucas’s	   Unlikely	   Legacy:	   The	   Rise	   of	   Background	   Principles	   as	   Categorical	  
Takings	   Defenses,	   29	   HARV.	   ENVTL.	   L.	   REV.	   321,	   354–61	   (2005).	   The	   authors	   further	   assert	   that	   “Adding	   to	   the	  
unanticipated	   consequences	   of	   the	   Lucas	   opinion	   was	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   categorical	   takings	   rule	   concerning	  
economic	   wipeouts	   it	   established	   turned	   out	   to	   apply	   only	   to	   a	   very	   narrow	   class	   of	   takings	   cases,	   while	   the	  
categorical	   defenses	   authorized	   by	   the	   decision	   are	   quite	   expansive	   in	   scope.	   In	   effect,	   the	   Lucas	   decision	  
fundamentally	   revised	  all	   takings	  analysis	  by	  making	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   landowner’s	  property	   rights	   a	   threshold	  
issue	  in	  every	  takings	  case.”	  Id.	  at	  322.	  
42	  Id.	  at	  341-­‐60.	  
43	  Id.	  at	  321.	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uses	   to	   which	   private	   property	   can	   be	   put	   when	   they	   threaten	   wildlife,	   and	   thus	   potentially	  
created	  an	  exception	  much	  wider	  than	  intended.44	  
	  
Notwithstanding	   cases	   after	   Lucas,	   the	   Lucas	   case	   itself	   is	   largely	   a	   missed	   opportunity	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  the	  Takings	  Clause-­‐public	  trust	  doctrine	  debate.	  The	  story	  of	  the	  Lucas	  case	  often	  ends	  with	  
the	  Supreme	  Court	  ruling.	  The	  charge	  given	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  the	  state	  on	  remand	  to	  the	  
South	  Carolina	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  to	  formulate	  arguments	  as	  to	  whether	  there	  were	  any	  background	  
principles	   of	   nuisance	   or	   property	   law	   that	   applied	   and	   that	   could	   avoid	   takings	   liability.45	  The	   only	  
documentation	  that	  arose	  out	  of	  the	  remand	  was	  an	  order	  on	  remand	  declaring	  that	  there	  were	  no	  such	  
background	   principles.	   Yet	   the	   Lucas	   story	   provides	   a	   far	   more	   instructive	   and	   rich	   lesson	   than	   the	  
documentation	  would	  suggest.	  	  
This	   lesson	   comes	   alive	   when	   one	   listens	   to	   the	   oral	   arguments	   made	   on	   remand,	   which	   were	  
neither	   transcribed	   nor	   documented	   in	   any	   fashion.46	  During	   oral	   argument,	   the	   South	   Carolina	  
Supreme	   Court	   noted	   that	   proving	   that	   a	   background	   principle	   of	   nuisance	   law	   could	   overcome	   the	  
takings	  claim	  would	  be	  a	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  task	  for	  the	  state47—how	  would	  David	  Lucas	  building	  
a	   beach	   home	   on	   his	   property	   be	   a	   nuisance	   to	   neighbors	   who	   also	  maintained	   beach	   homes?	   Yet,	  
notwithstanding	  the	  difficulty	  of	  proving	  nuisance,	  the	  state	  of	  South	  Carolina	  missed	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
argue	  one	  of	  the	  many	  other	  background	  principles	  of	  property	  law	  noted	  above,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  
public	  trust	  doctrine.	  Beyond	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  state	  utterly	  failed	  to	  understand	  what	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  
Court	  required	  it	  to	  prove	  on	  remand,	  even	  when	  invited	  by	  the	  South	  Carolina	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  argue	  
the	  public	   trust	   doctrine	   as	   a	   background	  principle	   of	   property	   law	   that	  might	   overcome	   the	   takings	  
claim,	  the	  state	  failed	  to	  do	  so.48	  Remarkably,	  Justice	  Toal	  invited	  the	  Council	  to	  argue	  application	  of	  the	  
public	  trust	  doctrine	  to	  the	  BMA:	  	  
	  
Would	   you	   propose	   to	   justify	   [the	   BMA]	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   some	   common	   law	   doctrine	   of	   …	  
noxious	  use	  or	  on	  some	  public	  trust	  doctrine?	  …	  [T]he	  Supreme	  Court	  forbids	  you	  to	  justify	  the	  
regulation	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   ‘88	   Beach	   Management	   Act.	   They	   say	   if	   you	   are	   going	   to	  
completely	   prohibit	   use	   under	   that	   Act,	   then	   you	   have	   “taken,”	   certainly	   for	   that	   period	   of	  
time	  …	  [T]hey	   leave	  open	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  you	  could	   justify	  that	  regulatory	  taking	  on	  
some	  common	  law	  basis,	  which	  presumably	  would	  include	  public	  trust.49	  
	  
Even	  so,	  the	  State	  of	  South	  Carolina	  was	  unprepared	  to	  make	  a	  public	  trust	  argument	  that	  would	  
expand	   public	   trust	   protection	   to	   these	   resources.	   About	   ten	   years	   after	  Lucas,	   the	   state	   upheld	   the	  
public	   trust	   doctrine	   as	   a	   means	   of	   protecting	   a	   more	   traditional	   public	   trust	   resource	   than	   upland	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Babcock,	  supra	  note	  27,	  at	  855.	  
45	  Lucas,	  505	  U.S.	  at	  1031.	  
46	  See	  Hudson,	  supra	  note	  20.	  
47	  The	  South	  Carolina	  Supreme	  Court	  noted	  that	  there	  were	  “fine	  homes	  built	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  …	  these	  two	  lots.	  
There	  is	  no	  way	  in	  the	  world	  you	  are	  going	  to	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  that	  …	  a	  nuisance	  is	  going	  to	  be	  created	  there	  by	  
building	   a	   home…”	  Audio	   tape:	  Oral	   argument	   before	   the	  South	  Carolina	  Supreme	  Court	   on	   remand	   from	   the	  
Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	   in	  Lucas	  v.	  S.C.	  Coastal	  Council	   (Nov.	  18,	  1992)	   (on	   file	  with	  South	  Carolina	  Supreme	  
Court	  Library).	  
48	  Hudson,	   supra	   note	   20,	   at	   130-­‐36;	   Audio	   tape:	   Oral	   argument	   before	   the	   South	   Carolina	   Supreme	   Court	   on	  
remand	   from	   the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	   in	  Lucas	   v.	  S.C.	  Coastal	  Council	   (Nov.	   18,	   1992)	   (on	   file	  with	  South	  
Carolina	  Supreme	  Court	  Library).	  
49	  Audio	   tape:	  Oral	   argument	   before	   the	   South	   Carolina	   Supreme	  Court	   on	   remand	   from	   the	   Supreme	  Court’s	  
decision	   in	   Lucas	   v.	   S.C.	   Coastal	   Council	   (Nov.	   18,	   1992)	   (on	   file	   with	   South	   Carolina	   Supreme	   Court	   Library)	  
(emphasis	  added).	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coastal	   resources—that	   is,	   navigable	   waters	   and	   tidal	   lands.	   In	  McQueen	   v.	   S.C.	   Coastal	   Council,50	  a	  
landowner	   claimed	   that	   he	   was	   deprived	   of	   all	   economically	   beneficial	   use	   of	   his	   property	   by	  
regulations	  that	  forbid	  him	  from	  backfilling	  wetlands	  to	  regain	  property	  lost	  to	  rising	  tides.	  McQueen’s	  
takings	   claim	   was	   denied	   by	   the	   court,	   which	   noted	   the	   longstanding	   South	   Carolina	   common	   law	  
tradition	  of	  applying	  public	  trust	  principles	  to	  navigable	  waters	  and	  tidal	  lands.	  	  
	  
South	  Carolina	  has	  a	  long	  line	  of	  cases	  regarding	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  in	  the	  context	  of	  land	  
bordering	   navigable	  waters.	   Historically,	   the	   State	   holds	   presumptive	   title	   to	   land	   below	   the	  
high	  water	  mark.	  As	  stated	  by	  this	  Court	  in	  1884,	  not	  only	  does	  the	  State	  hold	  title	  to	  this	  land	  
in	   jus	   privatum,	   it	   holds	   it	   in	   jus	   publicum,	   in	   trust	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   all	   the	   citizens	   of	   this	  
State.51	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   McQueen	   dealt	   with	   more	   traditional	   public	   trust	   resources,	   those	   linked	   to	  
navigable	  waters,	  Lucas	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  important	  missed	  opportunity	  to	  refine	  understandings	  of	  
the	  intersection	  of	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  and	  Takings	  Clause	  along	  the	  coast,	  especially	  since	  another	  
South	   Carolina	   Supreme	   Court	   case,	   decided	   over	   four	   years	   prior	   to	  Lucas,	   applied	   the	   public	   trust	  
doctrine	  to	  protect	  upland	  streams	  and	  marshland	  from	   impoundment	  by	  the	  South	  Carolina	  Coastal	  
Council.52	  
Ultimately,	   the	  historical	  drivers	  of	   tension	  between	   the	  public	   trust	  doctrine	  and	  Takings	  Clause	  
along	   the	   coast	   in	   a	   time	   of	   climate	   change	   provides	   an	   opportunity	   to	   explore	   three	   important	  
implications	   of	   U.S.	   jurisprudence	   and	   constitutional	   law	   in	   these	   two	   areas.	   The	   first	   implication	  
regards	  the	  fact-­‐specific	  inquiries	  that	  will	  arise	  as	  legal	  disputes	  stem	  from	  climate-­‐induced	  changes	  in	  
the	   coastal	   zone.	   None	   of	   the	   examples	   outlined	   here	   are	   particularly	   novel,	   as	   scholars	   have	  
highlighted	  the	   interplay	  between	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  and	  public	   trust	  doctrine	   for	  most	   (if	  not	  all)	  of	  
them	  in	  the	  literature.53	  Nonetheless,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  climate	  change	  impacts	  on	  the	  coast	  there	  are	  
“easy”	   cases	   and	   there	   are	   “hard”	   cases.	   Here,	   the	   descriptors	   “easy”	   and	   “hard”	   are	   used	   to	   simply	  
signify	   that	   there	   are	   areas	   that	   have	   been	   jurisprudentially	   explored	   and	   developed	   fairly	   well	   and	  
those	   that	   have	   not,	   though	   these	   areas	   differ	   by	   state	   of	   course.	   For	   example,	   cases	   like	  McQueen	  
provide	   guidance	   for	   resolving	   the	   balance	   between	   the	   public	   trust	   doctrine	   and	   Takings	   Clause	   in	  
cases	  where	  private	  property	  owners	  seek	  to	  backfill	  land	  that	  has	  become	  submerged	  due	  to	  sea	  level	  
rise.	  Stop	  the	  Beach	  Renourishment	  does	  the	  same	  for	  disputes	  over	  who	  owns	  dry	  sand	  beach	  when	  the	  
government	   undertakes	   beach	   renourishment	   or	   restoration	   projects.54	  Medlock	   indicates	   that	   some	  
states	   consider	   the	  public	   trust	  doctrine	   to	   apply	   to	  upland	  marshes	   connected	   to	  navigable	   streams	  
and	  rivers,	  which	  could	  avoid	  takings	  claims	  for	  the	  regulatory	  preservation	  of	  such	  resources.55	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  580	  S.E.2d	  116	  (2003).	  
51	  Id.	  at	  119	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  
52	  State	  ex	  rel.	  Medlock	  v.	  S.C.	  Coastal	  Council,	  346	  S.E.2d	  716	  (1986).	  
53	  See,	   e.g.,	  Margaret	   E.	   Peloso	  &	  Margaret	  R.	  Caldwell,	  Dynamic	  Property	  Rights:	   The	  Public	   Trust	  Doctrine	   and	  
Takings	   in	  a	  Changing	  Climate,	  30	  STAN.	  ENV.	  L.J.	  51	  (2011);	  Michael	  Hiatt,	  Come	  Hell	  or	  High	  Water:	  Reexamining	  
the	   Takings	   Clause	   in	   a	   Climate	   Changed	   Future,	   18	  DUKE	  ENVTL.	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  F.	  371	   (2008);	   James	  G.	   Titus,	  Rising	  
Seas,	   Coastal	   Erosion,	   and	   the	   Takings	   Clause:	   How	   to	   Save	   Wetlands	   and	   Beaches	   Without	   Hurting	   Property	  
Owners,	  57	  MD.	  L.	  REV.	  1279	  (1998);	  Niki	  L.	  Pace,	  Wetlands	  or	  Seawalls?	  Adapting	  Shoreline	  Regulations	  to	  Sea	  Level	  
Rise	  and	  Wetland	  Preservation	   in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Mexico,	  26	  J.	  LAND	  USE	  &	  ENVTL.	  L.	  327	  (2011);	  Meg	  Caldwell	  &	  Craig	  
Holt	  Segall,	  No	  Day	  at	  the	  Beach:	  Sea	  Level	  Rise,	  Ecosystem	  Loss,	  and	  Public	  Access	  Along	  the	  California	  Coast,	  34	  
ECOLOGY	  L.Q.	  533	  (2007).	  
54 Stop	  the	  Beach	  Renourishment,	  Inc.	  v.	  Fl.	  Dep’t	  Envtl.	  Prot.,	  130	  S.	  Ct.	  2592	  (2010). 
55 State	  ex	  rel.	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On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  outer	  bounds	  of	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine’s	  scope	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  overcome	  
takings	   claims	   in	   the	   context	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   the	   coast	   are	   woefully	   underdeveloped	  
jurisprudentially.	  Will	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  expand	  to	  overcome	  takings	  claims	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  
upland	   resources	   like	   wetlands	   that	   act	   as	   preventative	   coastal	   land	   loss	   mitigation	   or	   adaptation	  
measures	   (buffer	   zones	   for	   storm	   surge)	   notwithstanding	   questions	   of	   navigability?56	  In	   addition	   to	  
Medlock,	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court,	  in	  Phillips	  Petroleum	  Co.	  v.	  Mississippi,57	  considered	  whether	  the	  state	  
of	  Mississippi	  could	  invoke	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  to	  protect	  non-­‐navigable	  tidelands.	  The	  Court	  noted	  
the	   long	   line	   of	   cases	   upholding	   “State[	   ]	   dominion	   over	   lands	   beneath	   tidal	   waters.”58	  The	   Court	  
concluded	   that	   “our	   cases	   firmly	   establish	   that	   the	   States,	   upon	   entering	   the	   Union,	   were	   given	  
ownership	  over	  all	  lands	  beneath	  waters	  subject	  to	  the	  tide’s	  influence.”59	  Yet	  state	  courts	  may	  expand	  
the	   doctrine	   beyond	   lands	   covered	   by	   the	   tides	   or	   that	   are	   navigable-­‐in-­‐fact,	   as	   California	   did	   in	  
protecting	  non-­‐navigable	  tributaries	  feeding	  a	  navigable	  body	  containing	  important	  species	  habitat	   in	  
National	  Audubon	  Soc’y	  v.	  Superior	  Court.60	  	  
As	   Hurricanes	   Isaac	   and	   Sandy	   recently	   demonstrated,	   storm	   surge	   disasters	   will	   become	  more	  
frequent	  with	  sea	   level	   rise	  and	   increased	  hurricane	  activity.	  As	  a	   result,	  protection	  of	  non-­‐traditional	  
landscapes	  will	   be	   needed	   to	   adapt	   to	   climate	   change	   impacts	   in	   an	   optimal	  manner.	   Also	   consider	  
wetland	   restoration	   programs	   like	   those	   recently	   put	   forth	   in	   the	   state	   of	   Louisiana’s	  Comprehensive	  
Master	   Plan	   for	   a	   Sustainable	   Coast	   (Master	   Plan),	   which	   plans	   to	   invest	   $50	   billion	   over	   upcoming	  
decades	  to	  restore	  the	  Louisiana	  coast	  and	  mitigate	  coastal	  land	  loss	  by	  fighting	  the	  encroaching	  sea.61	  
The	   plan	   seeks	   the	   cooperation	   of	   private	   property	   owners	   to	   put	   such	   projects	   into	   place,62	  but	   it	  
remains	   to	  be	  seen	  whether	  states	  will	  be	  able	   to	  prescribe	  more	  stringent	   requirements	  on	  property	  
owners	   to	   achieve	   coastal	   land	   loss	   mitigation	   goals	   without	   takings	   limitations	   in	   the	   event	   that	  
landowners	   do	   not	   voluntarily	   cooperate.	   The	   same	   might	   be	   said	   for	   sediment	   diversions,	   levee	  
removal	  projects	   that	  may	   flood	  properties	   to	  build	  up	   land	  and	  avoid	  subsidence,	   levee	  construction	  
projects	  that	  send	  water	  to	  neighboring	  properties,	  or	  other	  similar	  land	  building	  and	  coastal	  armoring	  
projects.63	  Even	  government	  choices	  not	  to	  protect	  certain	  lands	  from	  sea	  level	  rise	  in	  favor	  of	  others	  or	  
not	  to	  re-­‐establish	  public	  and	  private	  access	  to	  “marooned”	  property	  could	  conceptually	  lead	  to	  takings	  
claims.64	  What	   about	   outright	   prohibitions	   on	   development	   in	   particularly	   vulnerable	   areas?	   Can	  
governments	  undertake	  these	  measures	  and	  be	  free	  of	  takings	  claims?	  Each	  of	  these	  questions	  needs	  
to	  be	  explored	  and	  developed	  in	  the	  case	  law	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  governments	  in	  coastal	  areas	  the	  tools	  
needed	   to	   adequately	   protect	   human	  and	  natural	   capital	   as	   sea	   levels	   rise	   and	  other	   climate	   change	  
impacts	  become	  more	  severe.	  
The	  second	   implication	   is	  that	  the	  future	  manifestation	  of	  the	  Takings	  Clause-­‐public	  trust	  tension	  
along	  the	  coast	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  further	  understand	  the	  original	  intent	  of	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  
in	   balancing	   public	   and	   private	   interests,	   such	   as	   those	   the	   public	   trust	   doctrine	   was	   intended	   to	  
preserve.	  Perhaps	  nowhere	  will	  we	  see	  such	  a	  clash	  between	  these	  interests	  over	  such	  a	  short	  time	  scale,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  See	  Blake	  Hudson,	  Coastal	  Land	  Loss	  and	  the	  Mitigation-­‐Adaptation	  Dilemma:	  Between	  Scylla	  and	  Charybdis,	  73	  
LA.	  L.	  REV.	  31	  (2012).	  
57	  484	  U.S.	  469	  (1988).	  
58	  Id.	  at	  474.	  
59	  Id.	  at	  484.	  
60	  658	  P.2d	  709	  (Cal.	  1983).	  
61	  LA	  COASTAL	  PROT.	  &	  RESTORATION	  AUTH.,	  LOUISIANA’S	  COMPREHENSIVE	  MASTER	  PLAN	  FOR	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  SUSTAINABLE	  COAST	   24	  
(2012),	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  at	  http://www.coastalmasterplan.la.gov/.	  	  
62	  Id.	  at	  167.	  
63	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  and	  other	  potential	  takings	  issues	  in	  the	  coastal	  zone,	  see	  J.	  Peter	  Byrne,	  The	  Cathedral	  
Engulfed:	  Sea-­‐Level	  Rise,	  Property	  Rights,	  and	  Time,	  73	  LA.	  L.	  REV.	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both	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   in	   the	   courtroom,	   as	   along	   the	   coast	   in	   the	   face	   of	   rising	   seas.	  The	  ways	   in	  
which	   the	   above-­‐described	   conflicts	   play	   out	   will	   provide	   a	   potential	   opportunity	   to	   understand	   the	  
Takings	  Clause	  in	  a	  way	  more	  consistent	  with	  historical	  precedent.	  Some	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  
Takings	  Clause	  was	  intended	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  physical	  taking	  of	  property	  rather	  than	  on	  regulations	  (the	  
latter	  being	  Blackstone’s	  “positive	  laws	  enacted	  for	  reasons	  of	  state	  or	  for	  the	  supposed	  benefit	  of	  the	  
community”65).	   Indeed,	   regulatory	   takings	   jurisprudence	  has	  become	  quite	   a	  morass,	   creating	   a	   high	  
degree	   of	   regulatory	   and	   property	   rights	   uncertainty	   given	   its	   ad	   hoc	   approach	   to	   resolving	   takings	  
questions.	   Professor	   Treanor	   has	   argued	   that	   regulatory	   takings	   are	   inappropriate	   as	   a	   matter	   of	  
historical	   record,	   indicating	   that	  Framer	   conceptions	  of	   the	  Takings	  Clause	  might	  actually	  align	  quite	  
well	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  at	  common	  law.	  So,	  an	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  these	  
arguments	  might	  provide	  a	  window	  to	  reconciling	  the	  American	  takings	  revolution	  with	  the	  public	  trust	  
preservation.	  	  
Treanor	  argues	  that	  the	  Framers’	  belief	  in	  democratic	  self-­‐governance	  was	  the	  driver	  of	  the	  Takings	  
Clause,	  and	  that	  the	  Framers	  considered	  that,	  “given	  the	  proper	  institutional	  framework,	  the	  people	  of	  
this	   country	  could	  govern	   themselves	  wisely	  and	  well.”66	  Treanor	  argues	   that	   the	  Takings	  Clause	  was	  
drafted	  narrowly,	  contrary	  to	   its	  broad	  understanding	  today,	  “not	  because	  the	  founding	  fathers	  cared	  
too	  little	  about	  property	  rights,	  but	  because	  they	  cared	  so	  much	  about	  representative	  democracy,”	  and	  
that	   the	   Framers	   “did	   not	   bring	   regulations	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	   the	   Takings	   Clause	   because	   they	  
believed	   it	   was	   the	   appropriate	   responsibility	   of	   democratic	   decision-­‐makers	   to	   balance	   individual	  
property	  interests	  against	  other	  community	  interests.”67	  Given	  the	  Framers’	  foundation	  in	  a	  republican	  
world	   view,	   which	   “contends	   that	   the	   essential	   role	   of	   the	   state	   is	   to	   promote	   individual	   virtue	   and	  
commitment	   to	   the	   common	  good,”	   the	   Framers	   “treasured	   the	   institution	   of	   private	   property,”	   but	  
“[b]ecause	  property	  was	  valued	  as	  a	  means,	  rather	  than	  as	  the	  end	  of	  the	  state,	  however,	  republicans	  
believed	   that	   legislators	   could	   limit	   property	   interests	   in	   order	   to	   advance	   the	   common	   good.”68	  
Ultimately,	  Treanor	  provides	  a	  compelling	  argument	  that:	  
	  
It	   is	   thus	   wrong	   to	   read	   the	   Takings	   Clause	   as	   embodying	   a	   fundamental	   rejection	   of	  
majoritarian	  decision-­‐making	  or	  republicanism.	  Its	  adoption	  reflected,	  instead,	  a	  congruence	  of	  
concerns	  relating	  to	  the	  perceived	  need	  to	  protect	  particular	  forms	  of	  real	  property	  from	  state	  
seizure.	  While	  it	  is	  true,	  as	  proponents	  of	  a	  broad	  reading	  of	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  often	  point	  out,	  
that	  some	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  revolutionary	  era	  state	  governments—such	  as	  their	  confiscation	  of	  
loyalist	   land—caused	   many	   of	   the	   founders	   to	   fear	   what	   unconstrained	   majorities,	   in	   the	  
absence	  of	  appropriate	  checks	  and	  balances,	  might	  do,	   the	   founders	  were	  also	  worried	  about	  
what	  wealthy	  property-­‐owners	  might	  do	  if	  they	  were	  not	  controlled.69	  
	  
The	   public	   trust	   doctrine	   may	   very	   well	   be	   the	   legal	   tool	   that	   can	   rebalance	   a	   modern	   Takings	  
jurisprudence	  that	  has	  arguably	  unbalanced	  private	  property	  protections	  and	  the	  public	  good.	  Perhaps	  
we	  cannot	  undo	  the	  regulatory	  takings	  morass,	  but	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine	  as	  a	  categorical	  defense	  to	  
takings	  claims	  brought	  against	   regulations	  aimed	  at	  protecting	   the	  wider	  public	   from	  climate	  change	  
impacts	  might	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  the	  same	  goal.	  This	  would	  provide	  a	  way	  to	  work	  within	  the	  current	  
and	  seemingly	  flawed	  regulatory	  takings	  framework	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  closer	  to	  both	  Framer	  conceptions	  
of	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  and	  what	  is	  needed	  to	  effectively	  combat	  climate	  change	  impacts	  along	  the	  coast.	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The	  third	  and	  final	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  historical	  and	  precedential	  drivers	  of	  the	  Takings	  Clause-­‐
public	   trust	   doctrine	   tension	   raise	   some	   important,	   broader	   reaching	   questions	   of	   institutional	   and	  
constitutional	  design.	  Either	   the	  Framers	  did	  not	   consider	   the	   implications	  of	  preserving	  within	   state	  
law	  a	   common	   law	  doctrine	   like	  public	   trust	   that	   could	   render	  meaningless	  a	   constitutional	  provision	  
like	  the	  Takings	  Clause,	  or	  perhaps	  Professor	  Treanor’s	  arguments	  are	  correct	  and	  they	  did	  consider	  the	  
possibility,	   but	   concluded	   no	   tension	   would	   result	   because	   the	   Takings	   Clause	   would	   not	   apply	   to	  
government	   regulations.	   Either	   way,	   beyond	   the	   Takings	   Clause-­‐public	   trust	   case	   study,	   the	  
identification	   and	   study	   of	   other	   examples	   of	   our	   melding	   of	   English	   common	   law	   and	   American	  
constitutional	   law	   in	  potentially	   inapposite	  ways	   is	  crucial	   to	  understanding	  not	  only	  the	  resolution	  of	  
the	  legal	  conflicts	  we	  see	  today,	  but	  also	  how	  to	  make	  congruous	  presently	  incongruous	  principles	  from	  
distinct	  and	  important	  bodies	  of	  U.S.	  law.	  While	  some	  might	  consider	  the	  historical	  currents	  to	  be	  too	  
deep	  for	  such	  study	  to	  be	  fruitful,	  in	  a	  free	  society	  institutions	  are	  what	  we	  make	  them,	  and	  ultimately	  
may	  be	  freed	  from	  the	  flow	  of	  historical	  currents.	  Recognizing	  institutional	  flaws	  such	  as	  the	  adoption	  
of	   seemingly	   irreconcilable	   principles	   of	   law	   within	   one	   constitutional	   system	   is	   the	   first	   step	   to	  
understanding	  what	  must	  be	  done	  to	  remedy	  the	  institutional	  mishap.	  Given	  that	  the	  political	  climate	  
changes	   almost	   as	   rapidly	   as	   the	   actual	   climate	   over	   longer	   time	   scales,	   to	   lose	   hope	   in	   the	  
development	  or	  adoption	  of	  new	  approaches	  to	  takings	  or	  public	  trust	  jurisprudence—or	  perhaps	  even	  
overall	  constitutional	  structure—would	  be	  a	  mistake.	  
Ultimately,	   the	   takings	   revolution	   and	   public	   trust	   preservation	   in	  America	  will	   lead	   to	   increased	  
legal	  conflicts	  in	  the	  coming	  decades	  as	  climate	  change	  affects	  the	  U.S.	  coastal	  zone,	  as	  well	  as	  inland	  
areas.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  many	   implications	   of	   the	   intersection	   between	   the	   Takings	   Clause	   and	   public	  
trust	  doctrine	  need	  to	  be	  further	  explored	  if	  we	  are	  to	  develop	  the	  most	  robust	  responses	  to	  a	  climate-­‐
changed	   coast.	   Because	   if	   the	   government	   and	   its	   citizens	   are	   not	   able	   to	   “take”	   these	   properties	  
through	  historical	  property	  doctrines	  like	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine,	  then	  the	  sea	  may	  very	  well	  do	  so.	  
